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J. FIELD, CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW. By Carl Brent Swisher. The
Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., i93o. Pp. viii, 449.
Oswald Spengler in considering the morale of Western mankind says
"Everyone demands something of the rest. We say 'thou shalt' in the conviction that so-and-so in fact will, can and must be changed or fashioned or arranged conformably to the order, and our belief both in the efficacy of, and
in our title to give, such orders is unshakable. That and nothing short of it,
is for us, morale. In the ethics of the West everything is direction, claim
to power, will to affect the distant." One will find in the subject of this
memoir an apt illustration of the philosopher's thesis. Here indeed was the
will to command, to direct, to dispose, in full and fruitful action. Seldom
have brothers achieved such renown in their day as David Dudley, Cyrus and
Stephen Field. Sons of a congregational minister of the oldest New England
stock they typify a generation that exchanged its interest in Calvinistic theology
for material progress. Apparently the Puritan had for the time being lost
interest in domineering over the religious beliefs and social habits of his weaker
neighbors and was ready to devote his tireless energy and boundless ambition
to the organization, development and control of the great industrial and agricultural empire to which he had fallen heir. It was to California that Stephen
J. Field was drawn in the early years of the gold rush. Dr. Swisher draws
a spirited picture of the part played by his hero in those eventful years. And
who indeed was better equipped to play a leading part than Field, then in his
early manhood, educated at Williams College under Mark Hopkins, broadened
by European travel far beyond the experience of most Americans of his time,
introduced to the practice of the law by an elder brother who was not only
a leading figure at the bar but has left an indelible mark upon American procedure? Although his career was stormy enough he soon showed his superiority to the swarm of adventurers and riffraff with whom he was thrown in
contact. He drafted the California Code, built up a large practice, at fortyone was elected to the Supreme Court of California, and six years later he,
a Democrat, was appointed by President Lincoln to the Supreme Court of the
United States, where he sat for more than thirty-four years. When Judge
Field took his seat in the Supreme Court of California that body was in low
repute, and with characteristic energy the new judge set out to bring order
out of the chaotic state of the law, particularly the property and mining law,
due the unprecedented circumstances of the settlement. Large sums were involved and judgments could not be rendered that would satisfy all the greedy
speculators involved. There were scandalous accusations levelled at the members of the court in anonymous pamphlets and in the press to which Judge
Field's reply was a contemptuous silence. Some of his decisions then, and
others later in the United States Circuit Court, especially those protecting
the Chinese from oppressive legislation, were very unpopular. The majority
of Californians, while proud of his national reputation as a jurist, with the
characteristic inconsistency of democracy, came to regard him as hostile to
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popular interests. He was, in fact, too consciously and obviously a superior person. In the Supreme Court of the United States Mr. Justice Field took part in
the momentous decisions of the recoristruction period and the era of Western
expansion. He was regarded by his contemporaries as one of the strong members of the court, a view that is still held by students of constitutional law. In
the end he became a dissenting judge; his individualistic outlook on life and
suspicion of government, partly the inherited tradition of his race; partly the
result of practical observation of the character and conduct of most politicians,
put him out of step with the movement for the expansion of administrative
agencies and social control, inevitable in an industrial age. In i88o the judge
was seriously brought forward by his friends as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the presidency, but fortunately for himself, in the light
of the subsequent experience of another eminent judge, he did not receive
strong support in the convention. His judicial work continued until failing
health led to his resignation in 1897, two years before his death. He had
written, it is stated, six hundred and twenty opinions for the Supreme Court,
fifty-seven for the Circuit Court and three hundred and sixty-five for the
Supreme Court of California, an impressive record. The long life of this
distinguished jurist was so intimately associated with the political movements
of his day that his biography is almost necessarily a panorama of historical
events, and Dr. Swisher has so regarded it, placing special emphasis on the
picturesque formative influences that moulded his career and the social and
economic influences that affected his thought. In an effort to be impartial
he has repeated much malicious gossip from hostile newspapers and from
the scurrilous libels of his enemies. It is a familiar paradox that we believe
almost nothing that we read in the daily papers for ourselves, but take seriously the same dubious stuff when it is dished up for us by a historian. In
the debunking process who will ever debunk the press for us? That Judge
Field was guilty of the corrupt motives imputed to him by disgruntled critics
there is not the slightest evidence worthy of serious belief. Without resorting
to the familiar methods of the little fellows in politics he could easily have
acquired a large fortune in the legitimate practice of the law, but he preferred
the dignity and authority of the bench and died comparatively poor. In his
treatment of the sordid and tragic Terry affair the author has dealt very gently
with the notorious and unpleasant principals and the silly conduct of some
minor officials in California. The Judge, however, belonged to the strenuous,
active type that almost courts criticism. Supremely self-confident, and thoroughly contemptuous of mediocrity, he would have echoed heartily Browning's
"What had I on earth to do with the slothful, with the mawkish, the unmanly? Like the aimless, helpless, hopeless, did I drivel being who? One
who never turned his back but marched breast forward, etc." The Judge lived
in a great period of expansion and like his contemporaries admired and respected constructive achievements, some of which candor compels one to admit,
took on at times the aspect of ruthlessness. Like most men of action Judge
Field is somewhat naive in his belief in self evident truths and offers an amusing contrast to his intellectual contemporary Henry Adams, whose "Education" is not only a penetrating survey of the American scene but the best
autobiography since that of Benjamin Franklin. In one respect, as a lawyer

994

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

sees it, this excellent contribution to historical research might have been
stronger; the center of interest is too exclusively personal and political for the
biography of one who was pre-eminently a lawyer and a jurist. It is very
true that in a book intended for the general public, technical discussion, unless
strictly limited, would weight it too heavily; but the fact remains that Judge
Field was well versed in the technicalities of the common law, and, with the
possible exception of his brother David Dudley Field, knew far more about
procedure than any of his contemporaries. This side of his character is not
sufficiently stressed although the economic aspects of his judgments are fully
treated. We would like to hear more of what his colleagues on the bench
and the leaders of the bar privately thought of him, and a few extracts from
his vigorous opinions on questions of substantive law and procedure would have
offered a better rounded portrait of the judge in action. Indeed, it is here,
perhaps, that his contributions to American law may, in the long run, prove
more lasting and significant than in the constitutional cases, which made a great
noise in their day but now lie buried in the deeper catacombs of the political
graveyard.
William H. Lloyd.
University of Pennsylvanid Law School.

IN JURISPRUDENCE .AND THE COmiON LAW.
By Arthur L. Goodhart.
Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931. Pp. xvi, 295.
The essays of which this book by the learned editor of the Law Quarterly
Review is composed, have all appeared previously in separate articles, but they
are well worthy of collection in a single volume.
Space forbids a discussion of more than a few of the interesting questions that the author raises. The first chapter on "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case," invites comparison with the pronouncements of other
learned persons. The essayist accepts as sound a statement from Sir John
Salmond,' to the effect that it is the ratio decidendi or principle of a case which
alone has the force of law, and then argues that the principle of a case is
found is found by taking account of the facts treated by the judge as material, and of his decision based on them. It is not permissible to go "behind
the opinion to show that the facts appear to be different in the record." This
is in striking contrast with the attitude of some American scholars who seem
to assert that the only authoritative features of a case are found in its actual
facts and the decision, because these contain the data for determining what
courts do, as distinguished from what courts say they do. For American purposes, at least, it seems as if both parties somewhat over refine the matter.
A realist can hardly deny that courts in varying degrees and with varying
facts presented to them, give weight in considering a prior decision to its actual
facts and the decision on them, to the facts assumed by the court as distinguished
from the actual facts, to the reasoning of the court and even to statements
which wcre unnecessary to the decision from any point of view.
ESSAYS

'SALMOND,

JURISPRUDENCE

(7th ed.

1924)
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Probably judges assert and exercise greater freedom in the United States
than in England in dealing with precedents; and this forms the basis of an
argument in an essay on "Case Law in England and America," that the bond
between England and the United States of a common system of law is weakening. The stricter adherence to precedent in England must be followed, the
author says, by a growing divergence of the law in the two countries. There
is no doubt some force in the argument, though it seems overstressed. Mr.
Goodhart quotes from Salmond with approval a statement that under the English doctrine not only lower courts are bound to follow decisions of upper
courts, but both the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal are absolutely
bound to follow their own previous decisions. If this is even approximately
true, it gives an importance to determining with minute exactness the principle
of a previously decided case; but it is scarcely too much to say that such a
doctrine seems absurd to an American lawyer; and he will find it hard to believe that an English lawyer who asserts it does not recognize that he is indulging in a fiction. It certainly is true that on many points the English law
today is diametrically opposite to what it was two hundred years ago, or one
hundred years ago; and the changes have not all been due to statutes. Instead of the old rule of caveat emptor, caveat venditor would much more
nearly express the modern English law. The law governing Impossibility and
Frustration for Breach of Contract, is unquestionably only about seventy years
old. "The original rule of English law was clear in its insistence that where
a party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself he is bound
to make it good notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because
he might have provided against it by his contract. That principle was applied
with full severity during the eighteenth century."'
It would be easy to find other examples of rules reversed. Possibly the
law of the next century or two may bring fewer changes than those that the
past one or two centuries have brought, but that there will be many changes
is certain. If precedents are always slavishly followed these changes can come
only by statutes or by decisions that make distinctions without differences.
It is true that the English law is becoming increasingly based on statute, but
Bentham's dream of the total abolition of the Common law seems still far
distant. The present Lord Chancellor, in a tribute to Mr. Justice Holmes
seems to indicate a possibility of flexibility in the English law somewhat greater
than Mr. Goodhart would allow it:'
"I value not less the way in which his work has been throughout permeated by a philosophic grasp of first principle, on the one hand, and of
changing social conditions on the other. In this sense he has taught us
all the manner in which law may be best adapted to new needs and new
purposes."
In an interesting chapter on "Blackmail and Consideration in Contracts,"
the author points to a distinction between what he calls moral and immoral
liberties, the latter being acts which are not punishable by law, but which are
nevertheless regarded as opposed to public policy. Exercising an immoral libe Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. Allen [1918] 1 K. B. 540.

'Sankey, Mr. Justice Holmes (1931)

44 HARV. L. REV. 68o.
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erty, he points out, is insufficient consideration for a promise and the enforcement of a bargain to refrain from exercising an immoral liberty he deems so
opposed to public policy as to preclude enforcement of the bargain. He criticises a statement in the Reviewer's treatise on Contracts, that refraining from
exercising an immoral liberty may be sufficient consideration. The criticism
may be sound; but possibly there are differences of degree even in immoral
liberties. Some may well be so seriously immoral that to sustain a bargain
to refrain from exercising them would be opposed to public policy. This might
not be true of all immoral liberties.
The essay on "Costs" indicates one reason why England can carry on
its legal business with so much a smaller number of judges in proportion to its
population than the United States. The expense incurred in English litigation
in the higher courts is heavy, in view of the toll taken by solicitors and barristers; and when to these and other necessary expenses that a party must pay
are added the costs to which the winner is entitled from the losing party, it
surely becomes important to be sure that you are right before you engage in
litigation. Costs include expense incurred in preparing a case as well as in
conducting it. Mr. Goodhart cites two cases where the costs that the losing
party had to pay the winner were respectively £7Oooo and £40,ooo. Here, as
throughout his essays, he is conservative in his views and faithful to the English tradition. He says in substance, "somebody has to pay the cost, and the
losing party, presumably the party in error, is the one that ought to do it."
Most American lawyers would agree that it is wrong to assume as a "necessary
conclusion that the defeated party was morally culpable in bringing action, or
in resisting suit, as the case may be. Nothing could be further from the actual
facts of life."
The Reviewer, a number of years ago, laboriously and with an endeavor
to be judicial, prepared an opinion for New York counsel that confirmed the
latter's belief in the validity of his contention in threatened litigation in London. The result was unfavorable, and the New York counsel subsequently
remarked that if a client of his was ever again sued in London for i5ooo he
would advise an immediate payment of f6ooo on account, in order to diminish
the costs.
The provisions in the English rules putting the imposition of costs in the
discretion of the Court is worthy of all the author's commendation, but it must
be assumed that in general the loser pays the whole or substantially the whole
expense of the litigation, including the cost of preparation.
Samuel Williston.
Harvard Law School.

THE LEGAL HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISm. By R. Y. Hedges and Allan Winterbottom. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1930. pp.
xix, 170.
For Americans the study of English labor law is more than rich with interest; it is essential. One reason is that the controlling ideas in American
labor law are of ancient English origin. Without a recognition that the wage
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contract is quite distinct from the ordinary business contract-a distinction
which has its origin in the treatment that the ruling society has accorded it
since, if not before, the Statute of Laborers '-the legal treatment of that
contract is inexplicable.F Without sensing the galvanic current that runs from
the Elizabethan Statute of Artificers through the latest labor injunction, the
law loses that seamlessness that gives to it its meaning. Without an understanding of the utility of the flexible concept of conspiracy as an instrument
to hold criminal and, in later days, tortious, conduct which to the judges of
yesterday and today threatened the complexion of their several social structures, labor law becomes a barren collection of rules and precedents. In short,
the dynamic forces that dominated the moulding of this branch of law can be
seen, like architectonic qualities, only in the wide perspective that English
law has to offer.
Again, England since 1824 has struggled whole-heartedly with the problem
in a way that America has still to do. It would be hard to find another century and another field of law so packed with purport. The ability of judges
to emasculate legislation to which they are hostile,' the inability of judges to
'"The history of the common law shows beyond question that its principles
were framed in the interest of the employer, and that in the mutual relations
of master and servant the servant was at a disadvantage." Taft, Presidential
Address (1914) 39 A. B. A. REP. 359, 370. ". . . usage is inveterate that
the employee shall trust the employer for compensation rather than the employer pay first and trust the employee for the performance of his undertaking;
and parties must be understood to contract with reference to the usage. Perhaps the origin both of the usage and of the law is that the employers have
been in a position to establish both." 2 WU.-rSTON, CONTRACTS (1924) § 830.
'It is impossible to conceive of ordinary business contracts being given
the extensive protection that the anti-union contract has been given in such
cases as Hitchman C. & C. Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917) ; International
Organization, etc. v. Red Jacket Consol. C. & C. Co., 18 F. (2d) 839 (C. C.
A. 4th, i927). Similarly until Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481 (1834), the
breach of an employment contract by the employee was visited with a denial
of civil remedies unique to that type of a contract. See Legislation, (193o)
43 HAxv. L. REv. 647. The doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216 (1853),
had long previously been established in the employer-employee relationship.
See Ordinance of Labourers, 23 EDW. III, c. 2 (1349) ; Mass. Acts (1718-19)
c. 14.

3Five successive legislative enactments were necessary to secure to workmen
the right of "peaceful picketing". In Reg. v. Rowlands, 5 Cox, 436 (z851),
and Reg. v. Duffield, 5 Cox, 404 (1851), Erle, J.., overturning the earlier construction given Sec. 3 of the Combination Act of 1825, 6 GEo. IV, c. 129, by
Reg. v. Selsby, 5 Cox 495n (1847), held that peaceful picketing was unlawful.
To permit this where the strike was for higher wages or lesser hours was the
purpose of the Molestation of Workmen Act of 1859, 22 VicT., c. 34. Its effectiveness was, however, destroyed by the broad interpretation given to "intimidation" by Bramwell, B., in Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox, 592 (1867). The Criminal
Law Amendment Act of 1871, 34 & 35 V'cr., c. 32, as interpreted by Reg. v.
Hibbert, 13 Cox, 82 (1875), similarly destroyed the effectiveness of this act.

The Conspiracy Act 'of 1875, 38 & 39 Vxcr., c. 86, again sought to establish

the right. See G. R. Askwith in Minutes of Evidence before the Royal Com-

mission on Trade Disputes and Trade Combinations, Cd. 2826 (1go6), p. 9.
The courts, however, construed it otherwise. Reg. v. Bauld, 13 Cox, 282 (1876),
Lyons v. Wilkins [1899] I Ch. 255. The right was finally accorded by Section 2 of the Trade Disputes Act of 19o6, 6 EDw. VII, c. 47.
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see the outmoded quality of the views that they translate into law," the straining effort of judges to reconcile the irreconcilable,' all these are writ large
upon the pages. But more than this one can learn much of the tasks and hazards of legislation-the necessity for effective processes preparatory to statutemaking,' the intrinsic difficulties in defining the limits of allowable conduct when
the conduct will not regiment itself into general rules,' and the importance that
statutes which alter settled judicial doctrine shall represent political forces if
effectiveness is their aim! Indeed, 1824 to 1927 and beyond, is in this field
a veritable epic of the law. To Americans, moreover, the English effort which
in trade disputes made permissible collective effort of practically every kind
and relied upon the criminal law to impose the necessary restraints, presents
a strange contrast to the American effort which at every step has distrusted
'Cf. Reg. v. Hibbert, msipr note 3; Rex v. Dixon, 6 C. & P. 6os (1834) ;
Hornby v. Close, 2 Q. B. 153 (1867), repudiated by the Larceny and Embezzlement Act, 1868, 31 & 32 VIcr., c. Ii6, and the Trade Unions Funds Protection
Act, 186, 32 & 33 VIcr., c. 61. Hedges and Winterbottom give these acts their
real due rather than ascribing the remedy to the Trade Union Act of i87i, 34
LAw
& 35 VICr., c. 31. PP. 53-57. Cf. SLEssER AND BAxER, TaADE UNoI
(3rd ed. 1927) 9-io, I2.

But see ERIE, THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE UNIONS

(186) 4.
"The most fascinating of these are, of course, the famous judgments of
the House of Lords in Allen v. Flood [1898] A. C. I, and Quinn v. Leathern
[i9O1] A. C. 495, which in themselves contained curious constructions of the
effect of earlier judgments such as Keeble v. Hickeringill, ii East 574n. (17o6),
and Carrington v. Taylor, II East 571 (18o9). The efforts to understand the
purport of these two House of Lords decisions on the part of the lower courts
may possibly now be relaxed since the decision in Sorrel v. Smith [1925] A. C.
700. It is interesting to note that the basis of distinction there taken was one
which Dicey had earlier rejected. See 18 L. Q. REv. I.
aThe English statutes from 187o onward were in nearly every instance
preceded by investigations undertaken by Royal Commissions, whose reports
formed a basis not only valuable in the framing of the statutory remedies but
also important to a thorough criticism of the statutes during their progress
through Parliament.
I The allowable limits of picketing were particularly difficult of determination and hence of definition. See Report of the Royal Commission on Trade
Disputes and Trade Combinations, Cd. 2825 (i9o6), p. II. The same problem
faces American chancellors in their framing of picketing decrees. See Jensen
v. C. & W. Union, 39 Wash. 531, 81 Pac. io69 (1goS).
a In the Parliament that passe'd this act, "the two leading officials of the
National Union of Miners, became the first :Labour members' of the House of
Commons." See WEa, HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (i920) 289-29i. The
Trade Disputes Act of 19o6, the most significant of all the labor measures,
inasmuch as it overruled the doctrines of the House of Lords as announced
in Quinn v. Leathern, supra note 5; Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Society
of Ry. Servants, [i9Ol] A. C. 426, and South Wales Miners' Federation v.
Glamorgan Coal Co., [igos] A. C. 239, was the resultant of strong pressure by
the Labor party upon a Liberal cabinet. The Trade Union Act of i913, 2 &
3 GEO. V, C.30, which overruled the judgment of the House of Lords in Amalgamated Society of Ry. Servants v. Osborne, [191o] A. C. 87, had behind it
a similar strength. Indeed, the era of effective labor legislation coincides with
the awakening of political consciousness on the part of labor. To what extent
the ineffectiveness of the Clayton Act is attributable to the lack of political
solidarity on the part of American labor is an interesting subject for speculation.
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the criminal law and sought through the exercise of wide equity powers
to fashion its own instruments of control.' With American labor law now on
trial, the English experiment cannot be neglected.
The wider social history of English trade unionism has already been well
done."0 But the legal history of the movement was wanting." This need this
slender volume of Messrs. Hedges and Winterbottom has admirably filled within
the limits they set for themselves. The first part of their book carries one
from the Elizabethan period to the Trade Union Act of 1871. Fortunately unlike most English law books, the authors make use of material other than mere
cases and so succeed in filling in the barrenness of precedents with the meaningful society upon which law played its part.'
From the purely technical
standpoint, the narrative is accurate and surprisingly complete.'
The three
"..
. broadly speaking, the political genius of our people has evolved
this system-that we have not sought to make strikes illegal, but we have
sought to control, and rigorously control, what was done during the strike.
The American policy has been exactly the opposite. The Americans have
sought to make strikes illegal . . . " Sir W. A. Jowitt, the Attorney General, in 247 Hans. Deb. (Comm.) No. 42, p. 392 (Jan. 22, 1931), quoted in
Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional Power over the Labor Injunction
(1931) 3I COL. L. Rr v. 385, 410.
"WRm, HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (i920), is the outstanding text on
this subject. Among other noteworthy volumes are COLE, A SHORT HISTORY
OF THE BRITISH WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT (1925); HAMMOND, THE RISE
OF MODERN INDUSTRY (1925);
(I929).

and

RAYNER,

THE

STORY OF TRADE UNIONISM

" Prior to the present volume the most significant treatment of the subject
was the brochure of Geldart, The Present Law of Trade Disputes and Trade
Unzions (1914) POLIT. QUART. No. 2, 17. ASSINDER, LEGAL POSITION OF TRADE
UNIONS (1912), is of negligible value. Other English works on labor law,
though competent, treat the subject primarily from a practitioner's viewpoint.
Among them are SL.ESSM AND BAEm, TRADE UNION LAW (3rd ed. 1927);
HENDERSON, TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW (I927); COHEN, TRADE UNION
LAW (3rd ed. 1913); ERLE, THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE UNIONS (i86g);
FERGUSON, TRADE DISPUTES AND TRADE UNIONS Acr (I927); GREEN vOOD,
LAW RELATING To TRADE UNIONS (1911); HEwTrr, TRADE UNIONS AND THE
LAW (1927); PENNANT, TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW (1905); SCHLOESSER
AND CLARK, LEGAL POSITION OF TRADE UNIONS (1913); SLESSER AND H.NDERSON, INDUSTRIAL LAW (1924); SOPHIAN, TRADE UNION LAW AND PRACTICE (I927).

"One regret, from the reviewer's standpoint, is that more use of these
materials has not been made. Particularly is this true of the scope of litigation in the lower courts, mainly unreported, detailed in WEDS, op. cit. supra
note io, which gives a better idea of the practical effect of the various statutes.
Parliamentary documents, and the materials to be found in the Parliamentary
debates, are also sparingly resorted to.
"In dealing with the rise of the common law doctrines of criminal conspiracy, the Anonymous case in 12 Mod. 248 (I69S), is overlooked. Materials,
other than the decided cases, tend also to give a fuller picture of the common
law background of this doctrine than would be gleaned simply from Rex v.
Journeymen Tailors, 8 Mod. 1O (i72); Rex v. Eccles, I Leach 274 (1783)
and Rex v. Mawbey, 6 T. R. 619 (1796). Much reliance was placed upon these
materials by counsel and judges in the early American conspiracy cases, when
the issue was presented to American judges as to whether Rex v. Journeymen
Tailors correctly stated the common law of England. See especially the full
report of People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler C. C. 262 (N. Y. 18IO), in 3 COMMONS
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latter chapters of the second part carry this history down to the Trade Disputes
Act of 1927. The intermediate three chapters, dealing with the enforcibility of
trade union agreements and the effect and implications of the famous Osborne
judgment," have a narrower significance in that they present problems more or
less unique to English law. Indeed, the technicalities of this portion of the
subject and its dependence upon statute law tend to make these chapters more
of a commentary upon the provisions of the relevant parliamentary enactments
than a picture of the relationishp of labor activities to law.
Of course, such a book as this needed doing. It will undoubtedly be done
again and, with this work as a basis, it will be fuller and so even better done.
But it has been done well and in such a succinct fashion that, like other concise
texts, this book will not easily be replaced. The broader university outlook is
something of a rarity in English legal literature, as in ours. A volume, which
retains that outlook and also misses none of the legal technicalities, deserves
high commendation.
J. M. Landis.
Harvard Law School.
AND GILMORE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDusTRIAL

See also

SocIETY,

BRYAN, DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CoNsPIRAcY

251.

(ig0g),

passim.
" Amalgamated Society of Ry. Servants v. Osborne, supra note 8.

LEGAL AsPEcTs OF COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT. By Herman N. Finkelstein, Columbia University Press, New York, 193o. With an Introduc-

tion by Professor Karl N. Llewellyn. Pp. xxviii, 295.
Any work relating to commercial letters of credit naturally brings to mind
the pioneer articles by McCurdy,' Hershey,' and Mead.' Their excellence sets
no mean standard for subsequent writers upon this general subject.
In two hundred ninety-five pages Mr. Finkelstein has covered the general
field of his predecessors, added detail, and given consideration to some additional topics. Indeed, one may doubt if any question relating to bank letters
of credit which had received judicial consideration before his manuscript was
closed, escaped the author's attention. An introductory historical risum of
the development of letters of credit is followed by a summary of the classes of
instruments of bank and commercial credit and the relationship to these of a
modern bank letter of credit. Promises to accept or to pay drafts are reviewed
at length in connection with a consideration of the enforcement remedies upon
a letter. Relations of the several parties to a letter, including the position of
correspondent and requesting banks and purchasers of drafts, are particularized
and compared. Conditions in letters, both those which call for documents
and those which do not, are reviewed generally and also specially as to the
'McCurdy, Contmercial Letters of Credit (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 539,
715. The Right of the Benwficiary Under a Commercial Letter of Credit (1924)
37 HARv. L. REV. 323.
'Hershey, Letters of Credit (1918)

32 HARV. L. REv. I.

'Mead, Documentary Letters of Credit

(1922)

22

CoL L. RFv. 297.
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requirement of the conformity of documents with the letter and as to the
effect of forged and fraudulent documents. Damages for breach are treated
in a special chapter. In the final chapter the author reviews the several legal
theories which stand in the legal background of these transactions.
In his preface the author indicates extended contact of himself and of his
manuscript with various members of the faculty of the Columbia Law School.
Among those to whom special acknowledgments are made for their criticisms
and assistance are Professors Llewellyn, Patterson, Yntema, Underhill Moore
and Douglas.
It seems open to question if legal problems of modern bank letters of
credit are most effectively treated by delimiting them from other accommodation contracts for credit, especially those of sureties and guarantors. In dealing with the modem commercial letter of credit as a "primary obligation" the
author observes as follows: "The issuing bank has incurred a distinct independent obligation contingent upon the performance of certain conditions contained in the letter of credit. The rules governing obligations of sureties and
guarantors have no application." This conclusion is too broad. A particularistic survey of the obligations of sureties and guarantors as well as of modern
commercial letters discloses that, as respect their fact bargains, there are
sureties and sureties and guarantors and guarantors, as there are modern letters
of credit and many of them. The legal position of the contracts of some sureties and of some guarantors and of some bank letters of credit is exactly similar on many issues. Those legal aspects which are exclusively applicable to
modem bank letters of credit assume less importance than the author's presentation tends to indicate.
The author seems to have felt purpose or pressure to picture in places the
"economic" and business aspects of portions of his subject. This impression
is gained from parts of the text notwithstanding its restricted title and notwithstanding inferences which may be drawn from Professor Llewellyn's extended introduction to the book wherein he undertakes, as he states, to set
forth a "non-competitive line of discussion," namely, "to sketch something of
the business and economic background of the institution Dr. Finkelstein has
chosen for his study." Without passing upon Mr. Llewellyn's exposition of
the "business and economic background of the institution," it seems manifest
to the reviewer that Mr. Finkelstein attempts the same thing on occasion.
These areas of the author's endeavor provoke further adverse criticism. From
his effective particularization in other parts of the book, the reader is taken
into involved summations not unlike those of a classical economist. Institutional
forms are reared by over-generalization on variable forms of business transactions for no useful--even introductory-purpose. - They are informative at
most only within the confines of the author's, own sentences constructing them.
(See, for example, portions of the observations upon bank and commercial
credit, pp. 8-14.)
This technique is accompanied by a process of simplification and further summation which recurringly declares the "essence" or "the
true function" of the institution.
An aspect of this process at times threatens the merit of the author's work
with his legal materials. Thus, as to many of the propositions of law which
are set forth concerning the "modem commercial letter of credit," the cautious
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reader frequently doubts whether the author evaluated the facts and documents
in the particular case and with reference to the particular issue involved or
had reference to an "omnium gatherumn"--his "modern commercial letter of
credit." The vice of the technique is also manifest in the over-simplification
of the comparison of the obligation of sureties, guarantors and commercial
letters as criticized above.
Subject to the foregoing reservations, somewhat supercritical, perhaps,
one cannot deny the author's thoroughness. The book merits much praise.
Wesley A. Sturges.
Yale University School of Law.

MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIoNs. By Quincy Wright. University of

Chicago Press, Chicago, i93o. Pp. xvi, 726.
This book is a critical, exhaustive attempt to set out the history and present
situation with regard to one of the most important results of the great war.
The first impression that the book makes is of the immense labor necessary to
produce it. This is shown by the great mass of material that has been gathered
together from all quarters. But gathering a great source of material is only
one step in the construction of such a work. That material, when gathered, has
to be sifted and compared and out of it selection has to be made; in other words,
the principles of historical criticism have to be applied. But the most important
step is yet to come, the interpretation o.f the material itself, what the material
means after it has been evaluated, the historical construction that is to be put
upon it. In all of these respects this work seems to show a high standard of
performance. It is very exhaustive, consisting of 668 pages not including the
Table of Cases and the Index. It has in it a most excellent and inclusive bibliography, occupying about 30 pages. It also has an appendix with valuable
maps of mandated territories, trade and financial statistics, statistics on the area,
population and trade of German colonies before the World War, and of area,
population and railroads of mandated territories. The appendix also contains
the text of the mandate articles of the League of Nations covenant and other
materials of great consequence.
The first chapter on "The Origin of the Idea" is an interesting one and
gives an intelligent approach to the whole subject. It shows clearly how the
ideas of expansion, colonization and imperialism jostled one another in the final
make-up of the idea of mandates. The development of trusteeship of backward
people had its origin as far back as the time of Queen Isabella and of the
Spanish Crown in their attempt to control the calamitous effect of actual Spanish
administration in South America. It was not, however, as this chapter shows,
until the eighteenth century that these humanitarian efforts became in any way
organized, and, as so often happens, the propelling force in them was economic
expediency. It is made clear here that the whole conception of dependency was
shifting from that of property to that of personality. The tutelage of backward communities .followed naturally from this conception, and the part of the
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United States in it in connection with Cuba is well shown by a note from the
finding of the Supreme Court in Neely v. Henkel.'
Another conception that is seldom brought out, but emphasized in this
chapter, is the growing conviction that imperial responsibility of trusteeship
and tutelage towards dependencies is not merely a moral responsibilty but a
responsibility under international law which has a legal basis. Such was the
situation when the war closed and something had to be done in regard to the
German colonies and certain European states that were left stranded by the
war.
Chapter II on "The Establishment of the Institution" together with the
footnotes gives us a clear view of the struggle that developed over mandates.
Should mandates, as originally conceived by General Smuts apply only to the
broken empires of Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey, or, as President Wilson conceived it, to the German colonies?
Another question of great importance treated in this chapter-What shape
should the mandates take, annexation, independence, or the limited relation now
understood under the mandate system? President Wilson is largely responsible
for prohibiting annexation. It is not necessary to go further into details, but
the chapter winds up with the pregnant statement: "But though mutilated in
details, sullied by the spirit of barter, delayed in confirmation and minified by
the mandatories, the system was finally put in operation."
The heading "The Reception System" (Chapter III) is also interestingly
treated. It is notable that German writers show an increasing tendency to accept the system, insist upon full adherence to its principles and urge that the
League supervision be strengthened. One reason for this clearly appears from
the work of Dr. Heinrich Schnee, who asserts that France is employing the
natives of German colonies in warfare of any kind, aggressive or defensive, in
any part of the globe including the European continent. Of course, the Soviet
Union and Turkey could be expected to be hostile, and the attitude of the United
States has not been over-friendly. It is of first importance, however, that the
League of Nations has taken the system seriously and is laboring to make it a
success. The degree of acceptance by the mandated people can hardly be arrived at for the reason that classes B and C are not highly developed and it
would be impossible to ascertain popular opinion. The attitude of the mandatory
governments has not been all that one could desire, as is so fully shown in this
section of the work.
Part II on "The Organization of the Mandate System" is well done; it includes Confirmation of Mandates, the Agencies of League Supervision, namely,
the Council, the Assembly, the Secretariat, the Permanent Mandate Commission, the Permanent Court of International Justice; they are all thoroughly
treated. So is the procedure of the various League organs in the discovery of
facts upon which all future action must depend. "The Supervision of Mandatory Administration" in Chapter VII is good, and Chapter VIII on "The Establishment of Standards" is exceptionally important and a very interesting treatment of the difficulties in the way of practical administration.
1 180 U. S. 1o,

21 Sup. Ct. 302 (1901).
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As complete a review of this book as its importance justifies is quite impossible for lack of space, but one must note Part III that has to do with the
more theoretical and scholarly discussions of the principles underlying the application of mandates. This part turns out to be also one of the very best parts
of the book. It seems sound and fairly inclusive in its treatment. Chapter IX
discusses the system of international law as related to mandates, and the very
fundamental question of sovereignty as affected by the attempted mandatory
system. There occur at the outset these pregnant sentences: "The United States
Government was able to function for years with the divided sovereignty devised by Madison and Hamilton in spite of the insistence of legal purists that
divided sovereignty was impossible. The British Commonwealth of Nations
seems able to do business in spite of the doubt as to whether sovereignty has
or has not passed to the self-governing dominions. So also the mandatory system has worked successfully for nearly a decade though there has never been
an official assertion as to the location o,f sovereignty and though the opinions of
unofficial jurists on the subject have been almost as numerous and diverse as
the jurists who have devoted themselves to the study." Yet this matter must he
settled and a thorough discussion of it in this book is very timely. The conclusion of this chapter is: "Under it (the classification of sources in Statutes of the
Permanent Court of International Justice) the most authoritative source of law
for the mandate system is the applicable conventions, i. e., Articles 22 and 23 of
the Covenant of the mandates. The actual practice of the League organs, the
mandatories and other states is gradually establishing customs which are the
source of second importance. After these, one must look to the general principles of law recognized by states in past contacts with problems of this character, and to the accepted legal meaning of terms such as 'mandate', 'tutelage'
and 'trusteeship' in the documents. Finally, one must examine the opinions of
courts and qualify jurists on the institution."
The remander of the book is taken up with examination of these four
types of sources. Of these, Chapter XI on "The General Principles of Law"
is especially significant. Its discussion is worthy of careful reading. And
finally, Chapter XV on "The Achievements of Mandatory Administration" is
enlightening, dealing as it does with the question of land tenures and wages,
education, security and freedom, as well as the more practical questions of public works and services. The author concludes that the success of the system
depends on full understanding of the facts by the League organs in order that
their supervision may be wise. Better standards and better sources of information are needed, and informal visits by secretariat officials and members of the
commission would be useful.
"The question of extending the system to other areas in the administrative
sense is of less importance than the extension of its principles. The League's
major work, however, is to focus attention on the problem, to coordinate investigations and experiments towards its solution and to see that the mandated
areas are administered in the interests of the natives and the world according to
the best learning and experience in the world, thus setting examples for the
administration of backward areas everywhere."
University of Kansas School of Law.

Frank Strong.

